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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
PROVO CITY CORP.,
A Municipal Corporation
Plaintiff/Appellee,

OPENING BRIEF OF
DEFEND ANT/APPELLANT

vs
JOAN PATTON
Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
A.

Basis For Subject Matter Jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals
This Appeal is from the conviction of Appellant in the Fourth District Court, Provo

Department, Judge Gary D. Stott presiding in a bench trial.
B.

Basis For Jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals
Final judgments of conviction appealable to the Court of Appeals pursuant to
U.C.A. 78-2a-3(2)(e)(1953 as amended).

C.

Appealability of Judgement
A judgment of conviction in a District Court is a final Order pursuant to U.C.A. 78-3-4
(1953 as amended).

D.

Notice of Appeal
The Appellant was convicted on May 19, 1997 of violation of Provo City Ordinance
14.34.080(1) Abandonded/Wrecked/Junked Vehicle, and sentenced on June 23, 1997.
Appellant filed a Motion for New Trial and a Motion for Arrest of Judgment which were
denied on August 4, 1997. A Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court July 23,
1997 and September 3, 1997. On September 26, 1997 this Court issued a Sua Sponte
Motion for Summary Disposition that motion was dismissed.
-1-

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
The issues raised on this appeal are all questions of law, and the Court of Appeals therefore
has full power of review, without deference to the findings of the Trial Court. State v. Pena 869
P.2d 932 (Utah 1994), at 936 and State v. Jacques 924 P.2d 898 (Utah App. 1996), at 900.
1.

Was the defendant substantially prejudiced by prosecution's failure to inform her of witness
Roger Gonzales.

2.

Did the Tri Did the trial court err in overruling defendant's objection to introduction of the
surprise testimony of Roger Gonzales, and in denying defendant's motion for new trial and
motion for arrest of judgment so prejudice defendant's case as to undermine confidence in
its validity and warrant reversal.

3.

Did the Defendant have a right to rely on the standards of enforcement set by a Court of
Competent Jurisdiction during prior cases.

4.

Did the Trial Court err in refusing to allow evidence of a Court established standard.

5.

The ordinance should be struck down as vague as it lacks standards necessary to prevent
arbitrary enforcement.

6.

The ordinance violates the defendants Constitutional rights in its application by failure to
provide Equal Protection and Uniform Application.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
1. Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense
upon request the following material or information of which he has knowledge:
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefendants;
(2) the criminal record of the defendant;
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or co-defendant;
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the
accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense
-2-

for reduced punishment; and
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause
shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant to
adequately prepare his defense.
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following the
filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The prosecutor has a
continuing duty to make disclosure.
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may make
disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information may be inspected,
tested or copied at specified reasonable times and places.
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order
such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party
from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just
under the circumstances.
2. Rule 30(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure:
Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial
rights of a party shall be disregarded.
3. Provo City Ordinance Section 14.34.080(3):
No trash, used materials, junk, household furniture, appliances, scrap material,
equipment or parts thereof shall be stored in an open area
4.

Utah Constitution Article I Sec. 24:
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.

5.

thereof,

United States Constitution Amendment XIV Section 1:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A

Joan Patton and co-defendant, William Patton, were served with summons on May 31,
1996, channn<* that on March 19, 1996, both defendants had abandoned, wrecked or
junked vehicles, or miscellaneous materials in their yard, in violation of Provo City
Ordinance 14 34 080 (Trial Index, pages 2-4)

B

Extensive informal discovery was conducted by the defendants, beginning at arraignment
and continuing throughout preparation for trial The Trial Court asked Provo City if there
was any problem with providing complete discovery City Attorney told both Ms Patton
and the Trial Court that the city would provide Ms Patton with all information in the file

C

At pretrial, the city attorney assured the Court and the Defendant that all matters in the
city's file would be provided to the Defendants At that time, the city's zoning officer,
Anthony Malloy, indicated to the Defendants and counsel that (1) The complainant in this
case was the city as Mr Malloy had been given a "Open" file on the defendants and that he
had decided to open a new file for 1996 (2) That he would be the only witness for the
city, and that he had taken all relevant photos Ms Patton raised the issue of vagueness of
ordinance relating to fence in that the ordinance states that a front fence can be nor more
than 3 feet but fails to specify whether the 3 feet is a height, width or depth dimension

D

Ms Patton prepared her defense based upon her thorough inspection of the representation
by the city attorney that she was being given access the entire city attorney's file Further,
defense was based on the statements made by both the city attorney and Mr Malloy In
none of the materials received by Defendants prior to trial and in no conversations with
either the city's attorneys nor Mr Malloy was the Defendant ever informed that the City
intended to call a Roger Gonzales as a witness

E

At trial on May 19, 1997, Mr Malloy stated that Roger Gonzales had taken the relevant
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photos that the city submitted as evidence, contrary to the representations he had
previously made at pretrial to the Defendant. Mr. Malloy further stated the lack of any
standard definition for any term in any of the zoning ordinances in this case. What is
perceived as junk to one zoning officer might not be perceived as junk to another zoning
officer. The city then proceeded to call Roger Gonzales as a witness after indicating to the
Appellant that Mr. Malloy would be the only witness. Ms. Patton objected to the
admission of Mr. Gonzales1 testimony inasmuch as they were entirely unprepared to crossexamine him on any matter, having relied on the City's representations regarding the
contents of the City's file and the source of the photos. Ms Patton's objection was
overruled because she had not filed an explicit written request for a list of witnesses. This
despite the fact that the court had ordered the city to provide and the city had agreed to
provide total discovery. Mr. Gonzales was the sole witness to testify that there was trash
in the Appellant's yard on March 19, 1996. In ruling against the Defendant, the Court
found insufficient evidence as to any matter testified to by Mr. Malloy, but specifically
found that there was trash in the yard on March 19, 1996.
At sentencing on June 23, 1997, Ms. Patton presented a Motion for Arrest of Judgment
and a Motion for New Trial, based on the Court's error in admitting the testimony of Mr.
Gonzales. This motion was later denied.
RELEVANT FACTS
Extensive discovery was conducted prior to trial by the Defendants. Beginning at
arraignment and continuing throughout preparation for trial the Plaintiffs were under Court
Order to provide discovery. In Arraignment Hearing December 4, 1996 at 4:
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B

At Pretrial, the city attorney, Gary McGinn, assured the Court and Defendant's counsel
that all matters in the city's file would be provided to the defendants At that time the
city's main witness, Anthony Malloy, in the presence of Mr McGinn, told the defendants
and counsel that he would be the only witness for the city, and that he had taken all
relevant photos Malloy had also made written statements to Mr McGinn, prior to the
filing of the complaint stating that he, Malloy, had taken all relevant photos (Transcript of
Sentencing Hearing, page 3) At Pretrial, the city attorney, Gary McGinn, assured the
Court and Defendant's counsel that all matters in the city's file would be provided to the
defendants At that time the city's main witness, Anthony Malloy, in the presence of Mr
McGinn, told the defendants and counsel that he would be the only witness for the city, and
that he had taken all relevant photos Malloy had also made written statements to Mr
McGinn, prior to the filing of the complaint stating that he, Malloy, had taken all relevant
photos (Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, page 3) This document was provided to
defendants in the course of discovery Defendant prepared his defense based upon a
thorough inspection of the city attorney's file, and on the statements made by both the city
attorney and Mr Malloy In none of the materials received by Defendants prior to trial and
in no conversations with either the city's attorneys nor Mr Malloy was the Appellant ever
informed that the City intended to call a Roger Gonzales as a witness (Trial Transcript,
pages 64-65)
At trial on May 19, 1997, contrary to his prior written and verbal statements, Mr Malloy

stated that Roger Gonzales had taken the relevant photos that the city submitted as evidence
(Trial Transcript, page 14) The city then proceeded to call Roger Gonzales as a witness
Ms Patton objected to the admission of Mr Gonzales' testimony inasmuch as they were
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entirely unprepared to cross-examine him on any matter, having relied on the City's
representations regarding the contents of the City's file and the source of the photos.
Defendant's objection was overruled upon the court's finding that Appellant had not filed
an explicit written request for a list of witnesses. (Trial Transcript, pages 64-66). Mr.
Gonzales was the sole witness able to testify as to any specific items in the Appellant's yard
that might have constituted garbage on March 19, 1996. (Trial Transcript, pages 68-74).
In ruling against the Appellant, the Court found insufficient evidence as to any matter
testified to by Mr. Malloy and also as to any matter alleged to be shown in the photos, but
specifically found that there was garbage in the yard on March 19, 1996. (Trial Transcript,
pages 114-116, 120-121).
At sentencing on June 23, 1997, Appellant presented a Motion for Arrest of Judgment and
a

Motion for New Trial, based on the Court's error in admitting the testimony of Mr.
Gonzales. Both Motions were ultimately denied on August 4, 1997. (Trial Index, page
42).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. When discovery is voluntary, the prosecution has an affirmative duty to provide the
defense with any inculpatory evidence prior to trial, including any witnesses the prosecution
intends to call. Under these circumstances, the defense does not have to make a formal, specific
request. The prosecution also has a duty not to mislead the defense. In this case, Provo City failed
to provide the Defendant, William Patton, with a list of witnesses and made several written and
verbal representations that misled the defense into believing that Anthony Malloy would be the
city's sole witness. This constituted error on the city's part, compounded when the court
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erroneously ruled that the city had no duty to provide the defense with a witness list.
II. Defendant timely objected to allowing the surprise witness, Roger Gonzales, to testify
at trial, and repeated those objections in post-trial motions. Inasmuch as the prosecution had erred
in failing to notify the defense of its intent to call Mr. Gonzales, the court erred under Rule 16(g)
and Rule 30 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure in failing to exclude Mr. Gonzales testimony and
failing to grant Defendant's post-trial motions.
III. The court's error in admitting Mr. Gonzales' surprise testimony completely prejudiced
Defendant's case. Defendant was unable to prepare to meet the testimony. The evidence is ample
that the defendants thoroughly prepared for such evidence as they were apprized of in discovery.
The entire conviction was based solely on the testimony of the surprise witness. The court
therefore erred in admitting this testimony, and further erred in refusing to grant a new trial or
arrest of judgment. The error was thus sufficient to undermine confidence in the validity of the
proceeding and provides ample cause for reversal.
ARGUMENT
I
DID THE PROSECUTION HAVE A DUTY TO PROVIDE DEFENDANT
WITH A LIST OF ALL WITNESSES PRIOR TO TRIAL.
Discovery in a criminal case is governed by Rule 16 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which states in pertinent part as follows:
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense
upon request the following material or information of which he has knowledge:
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefendants;
(2) the criminal record of the defendant;
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or co-defendant;
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the
accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense
-8-

for reduced punishment; and
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause
shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant to
adequately prepare his defense, (emphasis added)
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following the
filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The prosecutor has a
continuing duty to make disclosure.
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may make
disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information may be inspected,
tested or copied at specified reasonable times and places.
In a case such as Defendant's, where the specific evidence requested does not fit any of the
detailed descriptions in subsections (a)( 1) through (a)(4), which mandate disclosure upon request,
subsection (a)(5), the catch all provision, applies. While the wording of subsection (a)(5) might
suggest that it requires disclosure of the material sought only to the extent ordered by the court,
the law is clearly established that when the prosecution chooses to respond voluntarily to a request
under subsection (a)(5) without requiring the defense to obtain a court order, the prosecution
cannot respond in a manner that it is misleading. State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah 1987).
In fact, the aspect of "good cause . . . which the court determines11 applies only in cases where the
prosecution explicitly refuses to provide discovery and the defense must compel discovery by order
of the court. Salt Lake (Itv v. Reynolds. 849 P.2d 582, 585 (Utah App. 1993). This duty to
provide discovery is ongoing. State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah 1985); State v. Knight,
734 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah 1987); State v. Bexishe, 937 P.2d 527, 530 (Utah App. 1997); Rule
16(b), Rules of Criminal Procedure. This is especially so when discovery is voluntary. State v.
Kalliih 877 P.2d 138, 142 (Utah 1994).
When discovery is voluntary, the prosecution has an affirmative duty not to mislead the
defense, and specifically to provide inculpatory evidence. State v. Begishe. 937 P.2d at 532. In
Beszishe the defense's opening statement at trial, based on pre-trial discovery, was that the
prosecution had no tangible evidence linking the defendant to the alleged rape of a child. After the
-9-

trial had begun, the prosecutor attempted to discredit this statement by sending the alleged victim's
panties to the crime lab for additional testing. The defendant's only opportunity to counter the
evidence was through frantic efforts between trial sessions. 937 P.2d at 529. In Salt Lake (77v r.
Reynolds, the city failed to completely respond to the defendant's discovery request, but also failed
to inform the defense that it was refusing to provide all requested information. The defense did not
attempt to compel discovery because the prosecution's conduct had misled them to believe they
had no reason to do so. 849 P.2d at 585. In State v. Knizht, the prosecution offered to provide all
discovery voluntarily under an "open file" policy. The defense specifically inquired as to certain
witnesses and was repeatedly assured that they would not be called at trial. Nevertheless, on the
day of trial, those witnesses were called. The defense had no opportunity to prepare and was
misled into preparing a trial strategy different from what the situation demanded. 734 P.2d at 916.
This is particularly parallel to the situation in the present case. At arraignment, the prosecution
declared that it would provide all discovery materials to the defendants. (Arraignment transcript,
page 5). At pretrial, the city attorney, Gary McGinn, reaffirmed his intention to provide the
defense with all materials in the file (Sentencing transcript, pages 3-5), and at trial he was adamant
that he had done so. (Trial transcript, page 64). The discovery materials provided to both
defendants contained no witness list whatsoever. They did, however, contain a memorandum from
the city inspector, Anthony Malloy, to Mr. McGinn stating that Malloy had taken all the relevant
photos. Consistent with this document, and in response to the direct question at pretrial of both
Mrs. Patton and Mr. Humiston as to who the city's witnesses would be, both Mr. Malloy and Mr.
McGinn clearly represented that Mr. Malloy would be the only witness. (Sentencing transcript,
pages 3-5). The defense thus had no indication that any other witnesses would be called and no
reason to inquire any further.
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While the defense has a duty to pursue discovery diligently (State v. Kallith 877 P.2d 138,
143 [Utah 1994]), an inadequate response by the prosecution will logically lead the defense to infer
that there is no further information. Salt Lake v. Reynolds; 849 P.2d at 582.
When Roger Gonzales was presented as a witness at trial, both defendants objected
vehemently. (Trial transcript, pages 62-66). The court ruled, however, that the city had no
obligation to notify the defense of the city's intention to call Mr. Gonzales, as the record contained
no specific request for witnesses. (Trial transcript, pages 65-66). As is clear from Knight and the
numerous related cases, there was no need for a specific request for a witness list, and the
prosecution had a positive duty not to mislead the defense. The court's ruling was thus clearly
incorrect, and the conduct of the prosecution was improper.

II
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN OVERRULING DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO
i

INTRODUCTION OF THE SURPRISE TESTIMONY OF ROGER GONZALES, AND IN
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND MOTION FOR ARREST
OF JUDGMENT SO PREJUDICE DEFENDANT'S CASE AS TO UNDERMINE
CONFIDENCE IN ITS VALIDITY AND WARRANT REVERSAL.
The court broad discretion in remedying abuses of discovery. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938
(1994). Rule 16 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order
such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party
from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just
-11-

under the circumstances.

However, the "effective administration of justice requires that discoverable evidence be
provided much sooner than 'moments' before trial." State v. Begishe, 937 P.2d at 532.
Rule 30(a) provides:
Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial
rights of a party shall be disregarded.
When it is clear, as it is here, that the defense had exercised all reasonable diligence in
discovery and properly preserved all objections, the two questions the court must answer are
whether admission of the surprise testimony was error, and whether that error was prejudicial.
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d at 916. It has already been clearly established that allowing the
testimony was error, and the sole question remaining is whether that error was sufficiently
prejudicial to warrant reversal. State v. (\xrtei\ 707 P.2d 656, 662 (1985).
An error is prejudicial if there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for the error, the
defendant would have obtained a more favorable result at trial. Knight, 734 P.2d at 919. A
"reasonable likelihood" is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the
trial. Howell v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 909 P.2d 1279, 1282 (Utah App. 1996). The
quantum of probability required to undermine confidence falls far short of "more probable than
not". Knight, 734 P.2d at 920. State v. Jacques. 924 P.2d 898, 902 (Utah App. 1996). Indeed,
when the defendant can make a credible argument that the prosecutor's errors have impaired the
defense, the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution to show that the error was harmless. Knight,
734 P.2d at 921; State v. Belt, 770 P.2d 100 (Utah 1988).
In Defendant's case, it is clear that Gonzales' testimony was severely prejudicial. Three
witnesses testified at trial: Anthony Malloy, Roger Gonzales, and Brent Keller. The bulk of Mr.
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Malloy1 s testimony regarded abandoned and junked vehicles (Trial Transcript, pages 26 through
56) As a result of discovery, the defendants had opportunity to prepare for this testimony, as is
clear from the extensive questions asked by Mrs Patton Id. As a result, the court rejected
virtually all of Mr Malloy1 s testimony, and specifically found that there was insufficient evidence
on the issue of junked vehicles (Trial transcript, pages 114-115) While Mr Malloy did testify
vaguely as to "junk11 in the yard, upon repeated cross-examination he could not specify what that
"junk11 consisted of (Trial transcript, pages 24, 44-45, 62) Indeed, he openly stated, "I do not
recall specifics11, Id. at 24, and "I do not recall specifically what was in the front yard area11, Id. at
62 Mr Keller did not testify as to any items in the Patton1 s yard Id. at 87-99 Mr Gonzales,
however, testified very specifically as to "wood and lumber scraps11 in the yard Id. at 68-74 He
also testified, contrary to the written and verbal statements provided in discovery, that he had
taken all the relevant photographs Id. at 67-68
In contrast to the examination of Mr Malloy, Mrs Patton was completely unprepared to
ask Mr Gonzales any questions, as the court specifically noted (Trial transcript, pages 70-71, Mr
Humiston c Tm going to question him on behalf of Mrs Patton, but I guess she doesn't have any
questions prepared because we did not know about this witness11, The Court "I want the record
to reflect that") Mr Humiston examined Mr Gonzales as best he could, being equally
unprepared Id., pages 71-74 It is significant that in the end the court found the testimony
regarding junked vehicles, which was the bulk of Mr Malloy1 s testimony, inconclusive Id. page
114 It also disregarded all of the photographs Id. pages 114-115 The court found only that
there was trash, specifically firewood, in the yard, and this was a matter that only Mr Gonzales
had testified to AZ, pages 115-116 The court was very specific in limiting its finding to the trash
Id. pages 120-121

-13-

Had the defense had any notice whatsoever of the city's intention to call Mr Gonzales, it
could have adequately prepared to address his testimony Unfortunately, none of the matters on
which Mr Gonzales would have been questioned appear in the record, as the defense did not have
that opportunity If the nature of an error prevents the court from clearly determining the effect of
the error, the burden is upon the prosecution to show that the error was harmless State v. BelL
770 P 2d 100, 106 (Utah 1988) Clearly, the city cannot do so in this case
In determining whether a witness' testimony is sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal, a
number of factors must be considered
1

The importance of the witness to the prosecution's case,

2 Whether the testimony is cumulative,
3

The presence or absence of corroborating or contradicting testimony,

4

The extent of cross-examination, and

5

The overall strength of the case

State v. Jacques, 924 P 2d 898, 902 (Utah App 1996), State v. Hackford, 131 P 2d 200
(1987)
It is clear that Mr Gonzales' testimony was crucial to the city's case There was no
specific testimony regarding trash other than his testimony, and virtually no corroborating
evidence Cross-examination was limited by the element of surprise, and all other evidence other
than Mr Gonzales' testimony was disregarded by the judge
It is thus clear that the court erred in allowing Mr Gonzales to testify, and that error
requires reversal

-14-

Ill
DEFENDANT HAVE A RIGHT TO RELY ON THE STANDARDS OF
ENFORCEMENT SET BY A COURT OF COMPETENT
JURISDICTION DURING PRIOR CASES.
This appeal results from the fourth trial and conviction of the defendant, Joan Patton for a
violation relating to the appearance and upkeep of her property. In rendering a guilty verdict the
Circuit or District Court in each conviction established certain levels of compliance that Ms. Patton
was required to meet and maintain with the City being given enforcement ability of those set
standards. In the time that followed each conviction Ms. Patton has strived to continue to improve
upon the set standard. Yet time and again Provo City has changed the standard and level of
compliance set by the Court and charged Ms. Patton with violation of the enhanced standard.
The party that set the standard, the Trial Court Judge, had the authority to set the standard
of compliance. The Judge also had the authority to give the City and its agents authority to
enforce that standard. Ms. Patton had a right to rely on the set standard. In relying on the
standard set by the Judge Ms. Patton acted to keep her property in compliance with the standard.
Ms. Patton was never informed that the standard of compliance could or would be changed. In
relying on the Court set standard of compliance with this action her compliance has been to her
damage and detriment as the City by and through its agents have changed the standard Ms. Patton
had the come to rely upon causing her damage. When a city or person with authority to do so sets
a standard that is relied upon to the detriment of another when the standard is changed that city or
person is precluded from enforcing that changed standard. Provo City had a duty to inform Ms.
Patton of changes in enforcement. A/mon, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm.. 696 P.2d 1210
(Utah 1985), and Sim Ray Drive-Iti Dairy v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission. 517 P.2d 289
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(Or. 1973), and 2 Sim Ray Drive-In Dairy v. Oregon Liquor Control commission, 530 P.2d 887
(Or. 1975), and Accord Athav v. State, 626 P.2d 965 (Utah 1981).
Provo City should be estopped from enforcing the changed standard of compliance.
Schneider v. (IS. 119 F.2d 215 quoting R.H. Stearns Co, v. US. 241 US 54 at page 61,
"Sometimes the resulting disability has been characterized as an estoppel, sometimes as a waiver.
The label counts for little. Enough for present purposes that disability has its roots in principle
more nearly ultimate than either waiver or estoppel, the principle that no one shall be permitted to
found any claim upon his own inequity or take advantage of his own wrong."
IV
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO ALLOW EVIDENCE
OF A COURT ESTABLISHED STANDARD.
The Prosecution is barred in legal theory and by evidentiary rules with few exceptions from
bringing evidence of prior convictions in an eflfort to assert the truth of the matter then at hand, but
when the shoe is on the other foot the Defendant is not similarly barred. The basic elements of the
evidentiary and procedural rules are to effect fundamental fairness and an even field of play.
Wiscorn be v. Wiscorn be, 744 P.2d 1024 (Utah App. 1987) Defendant case was remanded for
further hearing upon Courts failure to hear his arguments in his defense. "Due process rests on
concept of basic fairness," Rupp v. GrantsviUe City, 610 P.2d 338 (Utah 1980). Due process
requires opportunity to be fully heard, Worrall v. Ozden Fire Pep/., 616 P.2d 598 (Utah 1980).
V

THE ORDINANCE SHOULD BE STRUCK DOWN AS VAGUE AS IT LACKS
STANDARDS NECESSARY TO PREVENT ARBITRARY ENFORCEMENT.
On its face and/or in its application Provo City Ordinance in vague to the point that it
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impedes the necessary due process requisite in actions such as in the instant case. 'The due
process doctrine of "void for vagueness1' has two central principles. First, criminality must be
defined with sufficient specificity to put citizens on notice concerning conduct they must avoid.
And second, legislated crimes must not be susceptible of arbitrary and discriminatory law
enforcement." (V/y of Seattle v. Webster, 802 P.2d 1333(Wash. 1990), at 1339. In Webster the
Washington Supreme Court was faced with a challenge of a Seattle City ordinance, SMC
12A. 12.015(B)(1) Pedestrian interference, obstruction. "Petitioner City of Seattle contends that
the ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague inasmuch as it includes an element of specific intent.
The requirement of a specific intent to do a prohibited act may avoid those consequences to the
accused which may otherwise render a vague or indefinite statute invalid.", Webster at 1339 which
continued further, "SMC 12 A. 12.015(B)(1) provides adequate notice to persons of common
understanding concerning the behavior prohibited and the specific intent required. It provides
citizens, police officers and courts alike with sufficient guidelines to prevent arbitrary enforcement.
It is not unconstitutionally vague." Emphasis added.
Unlike Webster in the instant case the Provo City ordinance Ms. Patton has been charged
with violating has no element of specific intent. Also lacking are basic standards of enforcement or
definitions to guide officers in their endeavor to properly apply the ordinances
B. THE ORDINANCE SHOULD BE STRUCK DOWN AS OVERBROAD AS IT MAKES
CRIMINAL PROTECTED BEHAVIOR AND/OR ACTIONS.
The Provo City ordinance should be struck down as overbroad as it prohibits innocent
intentional acts by its failure to include a specific intent clause. In Webster the Washington
Supreme Court found that except for the inclusion of a specific intent clause the ordinance would
have been overbroad, "The City of Seattle argues that inclusion in the ordinance of the element of
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specific intent saves it from being unconstitutionally overbroad We agree In Seattle v. Slack, we
held that the element of specific intent saved another Seattle Municipal Ordinance from
unconstitutional overbreadth " 802 P 2d 1333 (Wash 1990), at 1338

C. THE ORDINANCE SHOULD BE STRUCK DOWN AS VOID FOR
UNREASONABLENESS
"An ordinance which makes no distinction between conduct calculated to harm and
conduct which is essentially innocent is an unreasonable exercise of the government's police
power " Webster, at 1338 This ordinance unlike the Seattle ordinance makes no difference
between intentional harm and leaving the bike your ten year old was riding which happens to be a
bit rusty after six kids in the view of another who may judge it to be junk After all the Provo
ordinance in the plain interpretation of its undefined word states that one or more such objects
constitutes a junk yard Yet even though argued that a rusty bike may violate the ordinance a bike
that was just purchased and is new with no rust of scratches ridden one time may be in violation as
the ordinance in undefined terms states used objects
VI
THE ORDINANCE VIOLATES THE DEFENDANTS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN ITS APPLICATION BY FAILURE TO
PROVIDE EQUAL PROTECTION AND UNIFORM APPLICATION.
Ms Patton is a member of the extensively protected class of property owners The
ordinance in its current application is to her detriment and violates the equal protection clauses of
both the U S and Utah Constitutions The discrimination occurs because the ordinance is violated
not by the Defendant's own actions, but on others own reactions to her property A person
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affluent in nature who can afford that which is new will not be found in violation whereas the
Defendant on a lower rung of the economic ladder will have his possessions and surroundings
declared "junk" because of age and surroundings. Supported in part by Maiin v. Lewis* 693 P.2d
661 (Utah 1984), and State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454 ( Utah App. 1993).
CONCLUSION
The admission of surprise testimony despite the Prosecution's failure to fulfill his duty of
discovery is enough to mandate a New Trial upon a finding of sufficiency in the ordinance itself.
The clear violations of due process evident in this action which stem from an ordinance that
because of its legislative inadequacies fails to provide clear standards of enforcement, a provision
that requires specific intent leaves little room to deem the ordinance sufficient and calls for
reversal. As state so eloquently over a century ago and holding true today in (7/y of Los Angeles
v. Colin, 35 P. 1002 (Calif. 1894), at 1004 "If we concede the existence of the principle of
estoppel in pais against the public in certain exceptional cases, then this case is rightly decided, for
this is an exceptional case. If this character of estoppel may be pleaded where justice and right
require it, then it may be successfully pleaded in this case, for justice to these defendants demands
it. There are limits beyond which even a city, in representing the rights of the public, may not go,
and we think the city, in the present action, has gone beyond those limits."

DATED this 2nd of February 1998

-19-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that pursuant to Rule 27 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, I
mailed two copies of the attached Brief of Appellant to each of the following this 2nd day of
February, 1998:
Joan Patton
Appellant pro se
1067 North 750 West
Provo, UT 84604

Michael L. Humiston
Attorney for William Patton
23 West Center St.
P.O. Box 486
Heber City, UT 84032

Lisa Peterson
Assistant City Attorney
359 West Center St.
Provo, UT 84601

MR. ROMNEY:

1

Your Honor, actually it's Mr.

2

McGinn's case

He handles t:he zoni ng portion matters,

3

but I don't think very long
THE COURT:

4

Is that go:.ng to be adequate
Could it be mailed to them?

time with that pre-trial?

5

MR. ROMNEY:

6

Sure .

to s end them discover*y.

7

THE COURT:

8
Patton?

9

I'll just ask Mr. McGinn

We know the address.

Would that be adequate, Ms.

I'll have them mail you a copy of the

10

materials they have, and I think they can gee that

11

done before this date.

12

che pre-trial conference date for further discussion.

13

That would not be a trial date, chat would just be a

14

date to discuss the case to see what we can do about

15

it.

16

And then we'll come back on

Would that be agreeable with you?

!

MS. PATTON

Yes.

May I also inave it read

17

into the record, then, that in the event that I choose

18

to represent myself, may I speak for Mr. Patton as

19

well ?

20

THE COURT:

Ordinarily you may not, because

21

that 's a practice of law.

22

do - - we may not get to that point, so let's see what

23

can be done at the pre-trial, okay?

24

MS. PATTON:

25

THE COURT:

But we'11 see what we can

All right.
Anything else, Mr. Romney?

12

letter?
A.

The notice states the specific ordinances

which they are in violation of, describes what will
need to happen in order for compliance to be met, and
I notified them on that that if they did not contact
me within a specific time frame that the file would be
forwarded to the city attorney's office for legal
proceedings.
Q.

At that point what did you do next?

A.

That was mailed March n t h .

I did not

receive a response, and on March 19, 1996 I went out
to the site once again with another zoning officer,
Roger Gonzalez, in order to take photos that would
document the specific violation that I was preparing
to send to your office - - t o the city attorney's
office for legal proceedings.
Q.

And that was what date again?

A.

That was March 19th.

March 20, 1996 I sent

a letter to William and Joan Patton informing them
that the file had been sent to the city attorney's
office for legal action.
I neglected -- I'm sorry, and can I add
something?
THE COURT:

Go ahead.

THE WITNESS:

I neglected to mention that
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look at what's been marked as City's Exhibit No. 1.
Do you recognize that photo?
A.

I do.

Q.

What is that a photo of?

A.

This is a photo of the house that according

to the Utah County Recorder's Office is owned by
William and Joan Patton.
Q.

When was that photo taken?

A.

It was taken on March 19, 19 96.

Q.

Who took that photo?

A.

Actually Roger Gonzalez took that photo.

Q.

Were you with him at the time that photo was

taken?
A.

I was with him.

Q.

Does that photo accurately and fairly

represent the state of the property on that date,
March 19, 1996?
A.

It does.
MR. MCGINN:

Your Honor, may I approach the

witness again?
THE COURT:

Q.

Yes, sir.

BY MR. MCGINN:

I'm handing you what's been

marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2.
A.

What is that?

This is another photo of the property owned

by William and Joan Patton, taken March 19, 1996.
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CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MS. PATTON:
Q.

Mr. Malloy, what vehicles are in violation

of the ordinance?
A.

Specifically on that date?

On the subject

lot that we're discussing today there is a trailer
parked in the front yard area that is, in my opinion,
was inoperable, and violates Section 14-34-080.
Q.

And that's the only vehicle that you find in

violation?
A.

On this lot at this time, that is correct.
THE COURT:

When you say, "this time," whac

time frame are you talking about?
THE WITNESS:

I believe we're addressing

March 19th, is that right, or are we discussing today?
THE COURT:

No, that's correct.

That should

be the date you're speaking of.
THE WITNESS:

It was.

Q.

BY MS. PATTON:

Is the vehicle wrecked?

A.

In my opinion it was inoperable and

unlicensed.
Q.

Is there a definition of a wrecked vehicle

or an unlicensed vehicle (inaudible) city code?
A.

I'm not sure if there is or not.

Q.

Is there a definition of a wrecked vehicle
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in the state code?
A.

I'm not sure.

Q.

Is there a definition of a wrecked vehicle

in the policy and procedure of -- for your department?
A.

In Section 14-34-080 it does describe

certain vehicles that would be considered a violation
of that section of the ordinance.
Q.

(Inaudible).

A.

14-34-080.

Q.

Did you check to see if there was an

accident report filed on this vehicle?
A.

I did not.

Q.

Do you know if there's an accident report on

file for this vehicle?
A.

I do not.

Q.

Was there a report from a garage or a body

shop that this vehicle was in for repairs and did not
have a accident damage sticker?
A.

I do not recall if I received any.

Q.

Is it a subjective judgment by the zoning

officer as to whether the vehicle was wrecked?
A.

I do not believe so.

If it's inoperable

that is evident --it has flat tires that are on the
vehicle for a period of one year or several months,
then I would say it pretty well indicates that it's
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inoperable.

If it's unlicensed -- if it's licensed

then there should be tags on the vehicle showing that:
it is licensed.
Q.

Is there an occasion for one zoning officer

when they find a vehicle wrecked (inaudible) another,
both find the same vehicle to (inaudible) is there an
occasion where one zoning officer may find a vehicle
wrecked while another will not find the same vehicle
to be wrecked?
A.

I can only account through how I would

visually see it, but I can't answer for somebody else.
Q.

Is the vehicle junked?

A.

I would say it's inoperable.

Q.

Is there a definition of a junked vehicle in

the city code?
A.

I do not knew if there is.

Q.

Is there a definition of a junked vehicle in

the state code?
1

A.

I do not know if there is.

1

Q.

Is there a definition of a junked vehicle in

your department's policy and procedure?
A.

I do not know if there is other than what is

described in Section 14-34-080.
Q.
vehicle?

Does faded paint make a vehicle a junk
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A.

Alone they may not be a violation.

Q.

Does a missing molding make a vehicle a

3

j junked vehicle?

4

|

5

j what was missing.

6

I

A.

Q.

I guess it would depend upon hew extensive

Does a dingy look make a vehicle a junk

vehicle?
A.

I would say no.

Q*

Does something have to be unusable to be

junked?
A.

According to this section of the ordinance

when describing vehicles, it does nou just reference
junked vehicles, it says inoperative, dismantled,
partially dismantled, unlicensed, et cetera.
Q.

Is it a subjective judgment by the zoning

officer as to whether the vehicle is junked?
A.

If I'm assessing whether or not it's

inoperable or junked, then I would say, yes, it is
subjective to an extent.

But if it's inoperable then

it would be obvious to me or other people I would
imagine.

But once again, I cannot answer how somebody

else would see something.
Q.

Is there an occasion where one zoning office

may find a vehicle junked while another will not find
the same vehicle to be junked?

A.

I think I answered that, and I couldn't

ansv/er how somebody else would see something.
Q.

Is the vehicle partially dismantled?

A.

Is the vehicle partially dismantled?

Q.

The trailer we're talking about.

A.

I cannot see what's in the back of the

trailer.

When we were just meeting on Friday I did

point out, too, that the vehicle was -- well, last
Monday that it wasn't -- did not have tags that I
could see showing it was licensed, and it did net have
tires that -- you know, that they could be used, it
had flat tires.
Q.

Is there a definition of partially

dismantled in the city code?
A.

I'm not aware if there is or not.

Q.

Is there a definition of partially

dismantled in the state code?
A.

I'm not aware if there is or not.

Q.

Is there a definition of partially

dismantled in your department's policy and procedure?
A,

I'm not aware if there is or not.

Q.

Did you verify that this vehicle was

dismantled in accordance with the state code?
A.

I did not.

Q.

Did you verify that there was a license to
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dismantle, as required by state code?
A.

I did not.

What I filed on (inaudible) was

a violation of Section 14-34-080, which would include
not only that the vehicle is dismantled, but also that
it is inoperative, not licensed.

Any one of those

issues would be a violation of that section of the
ordinance, and require the vehicle to either be moved
off the lot or placed behind the fence or in a
building, not in the front yard set back.
Q.

Did you inform public safety officers or the

prosecutor attempting to dismantle a vehicle without
proper license may be violated?
A.

I did not.

Q.

Can a vehicle be operable and partially

dismantled?
A.

With this specific vehicle I would say that

it would be hard to operate it with flat tires.
Q.

How many flat tires did you see?

A.

I believe I -- if I recall correctly there

were two.
Q.

Did you verify whether the Pattons were

operating this vehicle?
A.

Prior to March 19th or as of this date, no,

I did not.
Q.

As of this date.
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A.

I did not.

I had not received any personal

contact with you at that point in time, nor had I
tried to initiate physical contact because of the sign
that is posted on your property that informs agents -that informs local agencies and representatives to not
enter your property.
Q.

Is it a subjective judgment by the zoning

officer, such as yourself, as to whether the vehicle
is partially dismantled?
A.

I would say that in part that may be the

fact, but again, it would be quite objective as far as
being able to see visually whether it is dismantled or
not.
Q.

Is the vehicle inoperable?

A.

I would say, yes, it is.

Q.

Is there a definition of inoperable in the

city code?
A.

I'm not aware if there is or not.

Q.

Is there a definition of inoperable in the

state code?
A.

I'm not sure whether there is or not.

Q.

Is there a definition of inoperable in your

department's policy and procedure?
A.

I'm not sure whether there is or not.

Q.

Are you aware of whether or not Provo City

has adopted certain state codes into the city code in
their entirety?
A.

I'm not sure whether they have or not.

Q.

Are you familiar with this book?

A.

I am.
MS. PATTON:
THE COURT:

Q.

May I approach, your Honor?
You may.

BY MS. PATTON:

Would you please identify

ard read the first marked passage on the following
page, 942, "Provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act
Adopted," please, right there.
MR. MCGINN:
relevancy.

Your Honor, objection,

I'm not following the relevancy of this.

THE COURT:
MS. PATTON:
THE COURT:

You're asking him to read-Just one paragraph, your Honor.
And cite again what you're

asking him to read.
MS. PATTON:

I'm asking him to read on page

942-010, "Provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act
Adopted."
THE COURT:
MS. PATTON:

THE COURT:

That is not 14-34-080?
No, it is not.

Would you address, please, the

objection with respect to relevancy then?
the objection on relevancy.

Ms. Patton,
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MS. PATTON:

If you'll just give me a little

leeway, your Honor, I can tie all this in.
THE COURT:

Well, I'll give you all the

leeway that you need, but you'll comply with the rules
just like Mr. Humiston has to comply with them.

And

we have an objection to the question on relevancy, and
I'm asking you to demonstrate and tell me why it's
relevant, and if it's not relevant he doesn't have to
answer it.

If it is relevant he does have to answer

it.
MS. PATTON:

According to my perception,

which may not always be good, your Honor, it's my
understanding that Provo City adopted this ordinance
into their code from the State.
THE COURT:

Read what she's asked you to

read.
THE WITNESS:

The title for this section is

"Police Ordinances, Provisions of the Motor Vehicle
Act Adopted."
Q.
marked.

Should I proceed to read the--

BY MS. PATTON:

Just only that which is

There's just one little -- right there, your

Honor.
THE COURT:

Has he read what you've asked

him to read?
THE WITNESS:

Do you want me to read it all?
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THE COURT:

The question--

MS. PATTON:

Just what's underlined.

THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

Just what's underlined?

The question to you is to read

whatever she's asked you to read.
objection.

I deny the

Go ahead and read what she's asked you to

read.
THE WITNESS:

"The Motor Vehicle Act,

Chapter 1 of Title 41, Utah Code as amended is hereby
adopted as a Provo City Ordinance."
Q.

BY MS. PATTON:

Mr. Malloy, are you familiar

with this book?
A.

Somewhat familiar.
MR. HUMISTON:

State for the record that

she's identified the Utah Code, I believe Section 41.
THE COURT:

Well, she hasn't identified

anything yet other than the book in her hand.
MS. PATTON:
recognized the book.

I just want to know if he
It is the Utah Code Annotated

Volume II, for the record.
May I approach again, please
THE COURT:
Q.

You may.

BY MS. PATTON:

Mr. Malloy, would you please

identify and read the first marked passage on the
following page, 41-1A-1009.

MR. MCGINN:

Your Honor, could I have a

moment to get there myself?
THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

State it again, will

you please, Ms. Patton?
MS. PATTON: 41-1A-1009.
THE COURT:

Go ahead, sir.

THE WITNESS:

I do.

Do you have it?

"Abandoned and

inoperable vehicles, vessels and outboard motors
determination by commission disposal of vehicles.

l,

a vehicle vessel or outboard motor is abandoned and
inoperable when a) the vehicle, vessel or outboard
motor has been inspected by an authorized investigator
or agent appointed by the commission, and b) the
authorized investigator or agent has made a written
determination that the vehicle, vessel or outboard
motor cannot be rebuilt or reconstructed in a manner
that allows its use as designed by the manufacturer."
Q.

BY MS. PATTON:

Are you an authorized

investigator or agent of the state tax commission?
A.

I am not.

Q.

Was the determination of inoperability made

in accordance with that state code?
A.

This state code references specifically

abandoned and inoperable vehicles.

Section 14-34-080

goes beyond only referencing abandoned and/or
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inoperable vehicles.

So you were cited for the

violation of Section 14-34-080, which in my opinion,
includes other areas than just being abandoned or
inoperable.
Q.

So you're saying that the city code

overrides the state code; is that what I'm hearing you
say?
A.

What I'm saying is what I specifically cited

you for the violation of.

If you're asking for an

interpretation of what the City's policy is, I cannot:
answer that.
Q.

Does the City have a written policy for--

A.

I'm not aware if there is or not.

Q.

Has there been a request for the

determination of inoperability under that state code
that you-A.

As far as I'm aware there has not been.

Q.

With no other definition of inoperable, has

this vehicle been determined to be inoperable by
you --by yourself?
A.

In my opinion, yes, it is inoperable.

Q.

Did you ever ask the Pattons if the vehicle

was operable?
A.

As I've expressed to you, prior to this daue

I was not in a position to speak with you, nor had I

33

received any response from ycu to the letters that I
had sent to you in order to ask you in regards to that
specific question.
Q.

Is the vehicle abandoned?

A.

I would say it's more than likely not

abandoned.
Q.

So your answer is no?

A.

Correct.

Q.

Is the vehicle licensed?

A.

I could not see anything that would

reference it as being licensee.
Q.

Does the ordinance make a distinction

between licensed and unlicensed vehicles, or are they
dealt with in this same manner?
A.

They are not dealt with in this same manner.

If the vehicle is unlicensed then according to this
section of ordinance 14-34-080 on a residential lot a
maximum of two vehicles may be maintained, but each
vehicle must be either within a building or behind an
opaque screening fence.

If the vehicle is operable

and licensed then the owner of the property is
required to provide legal parking for that and all
other operable vehicles that they own, or tenants own.
Q.
City code?

Is the term "opaquen defined in the Provo

A.

I'm not aware of whether or not opaque is

defined.
Q.

Is the term "opaque" defined in the state

A.

I'm not aware of whether or not opaque is

code?

defined in the state code.
Q.

Is the term "opaque" defined in the policy

and procedure?
A.

Is the what, sorry?

Q.

Excuse me.

Is the term "opaque" defined in

the city policy and procedure?
A.

I'm not sure whether it is or not.

Q.

Are opaque and sight obscuring the same

thing?
A.

I would say that they are.

Q.

Does the Provo City code give a height

requirement for an opaque screening fence?
A.

It does.

Q.

Does your department's policy and procedure

give a height requirement for an opaque screening
fence?
A.

It does.

Q.

Is non-sight obscuring defined as at least

5 0 percent open?
A.

I'm sorry, could you repeat that?
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Q.

Yes, I surely could.

Is non-sight obscuring

defined as at least 50 percent open?
A.

I believe so.

Q.

Is any fence less than 50 percent open

considered to be sight obscuring?
A.

Is any fence less than 50 percent open

considered sight obscuring?
Q.

Yes.

A.

Not that I'm aware of.

Q.

Is there a fence between the vehicle and the

public street?
A.

Between this specific vehicle?

Q.

Yes.

A.

There is -- well, there is a gate.

Q.

Is there a fence between the vehicle and the

adjoining property?
A.

Is there a fence between this and the

adjoining property?
Q.

Uh-huh.

A.

I believe there is.

Q.

Is the fence sight obscuring?

A.

There are numerous fences that we need to

address.

If we're not going to address the other

property, then how can I possibly describe the fences
that would separate the properties?
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Q.

I am referring simply to that (inaudible).

A.

The fence that is along the front property

line specifically in front of the vehicle, I believe,
was intended to be sight obscuring.

It's used as a

gate, but over the years the fence has continued to
dilapidate, and now as the photos depict, you can see
that many of the slats in the chain link fence have
either been moved or are in bad shape so that the
fence itself more than likely would be -- the gate
area more than likely would be 50 percent open.
Q.

Was the vehicle in substantially the same

position?

I don't think this -- oh, maybe it will.

Here we go.

Was the vehicle in substantially the same

position when the zoning officers approved compliance
during defendant's 1994 probation for zoning
violations?
A.

I did not work for Provo City at that time,

so I'm not aware.
Q.

Was the vehicle in substantially the same

condition as -- well, I'll ask this later.

Would the

City have had any (inaudible) authority and right
under the probation to bring the property into
compliance at defendants' expense had she not brought
it into compliance?
A.

I'm sorry, I didn't follow the beginning
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1

part of what you said.

2

Q.

Would the City have any enforced its

3

authority and right under the probation to bring the

4

property into compliance at defendants' expense had

5

she not brought it into compliance?

6
7

i

A.

What probation?

Q.

Any probation.

As an example, this type, if

8

nothing was brought into compliance, then would the

9

City enforce its right to say, "Take the trailer, take

10

the fence down?"

11

A.

I believe that that is what we have

12

requested of you to either move the vehicle to another

13

place on the lot or remove it from the lot to comply

14

with Section 14-34-080.

15

Q.

16

But the vehicle had been removed under

(inaudible) defendants' last guilty verdict by the

17 I City if trie vehicle was not in compliance at that
18
IS

time?
J

20
21

THE COURT: Ms. Patton, I don't have an
objection, but I'm going to sustain it anyway.

I

My objection is that we are not here to

22

discuss matters of prior hearings and any rulings with

23

respect to whether there was a guilty or not guilty

24

verdict, as you've characterized it.

25

into those.

Please don't get

Q.

BY MS. PATTON:

Has the standard for

determining a vehicle's compliance changed between
1994 and present?
A.

I did not work for Provo City in 1994, so I

couldn't answer for that.

in my opinion since I

started with Provo City in November of 1995 it has not
changed.
Q.

This is a 1996 (inaudible).

A.

That is correct.

Q.

So my question is, in 1994 has the

compliance changed?

Are you aware if the compliance

has changed?
A.

I would need to reference the 1994 ordinance

and compare them to today's ordinance to knov/ whether
they have changed.
Q.

Is the property presently in violation of

sub section 3 of the Provo City Ordinance in Count I?
A.

Could you show me a copy of that ordinance

that we're referencing at this point?
THE COURT:

It's 14-34-080 Section 3?

that what you're talking about?
MS. PATTON:

Q.

Uh-huh.

COURT CLERK:

(Inaudible) .

THE WITNESS:

You said sub section 3?

BY MS. PATTON: Yes.

Is
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A.

Should I read that?

Q.

You're welcome to.

A.

"No trash, used materials, junk, household

furniture, appliances, scrap material, equipment or
parts thereof shall be stored in an open area.

The

accumulation of more than one such item constitutes a
junk yard as defined in Chapter 14-06, Provo City
Code, and must be removed from the property, stored
within an enclosed building, or be properly located in
an M-2 zone."
Because I have not been on the subject lot,
I do not know what is in the backyard area.

There is

a sign, as I've described before, that prohibits me
from going on the site to determine what is in the
backyard.

Because I have not been on the site nor

seen what's in the backyard I cannot answer that
adequately in response to your question.
Q.

Does the yard have trash on it?

A.

I'm sorry, what's that?

Q.

Does the yard have trash on it?

A.

As I just said, I cannot determine what's in

the backyard area because I have not been-Q.

On what you have seen.

A.

In the front yard area I have not seen it as

today's date.

On March 19, 1996, however, there was

4

other materials that I referenced by sub section 3.
There were materials in the yard area.
Q.

Does the yard have used materials in it?

A.

When?
THE COURT:

We're talking about 3/19/96?

MS. PATTON:

Uh-huh, that's correct.

THE WITNESS:

Yes, there were at that point

in time materials in the front yard area.

Again, I do

not know what was in the backyard area.
Q.

BY MS. PATTON:

Is the term "used materialff

defined in the Provo City Code?
A.

I'm not aware of whether it is or not.

Q.

Is the term "used material" defined in the

state code?
A.

I'm not sure whether it is or not.

Q.

Is the term "used material" defined in the

department's policy and procedure?
A.

I'm net sure whether it is or not.

Q.

Does the term relate to items used in

building structures?
A.

Does the term or does the ordinance?

Q.

Does the term (inaudible) the word material?

A.

it may well refer to materials used for

construction.
Q.

Does the term relate to previously utilized
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fabric?
A.

It may well reference that.

Q.

The ordinance has a term "used material" in

a plural form in the ordinance violated if a singular
used material is present.
A.

I'm sorry, I don't follow what you're

saying.
Q.

It says, "used materials."

Was there used

materials upon that date?
A.

I would say, yes, there were.

Q.

Is it possible that the used materials that

you alleged observed were in fact a trailer loaded
with junk to be taken to a landfill?
A.

In the front yard area?

Q.

You have two pictures, correct?

A.

I do.

Q.

Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2?

A.

Uh-huh, that is correct.

Q.

There are some trailers that you've given

testimony to?
A.

That is correct.

Q.

Okay, my question then of those trailers, is

it possible that the used materials that you allegedlyobserved were in fact a trailer loaded with junk to be
taken to a landfill?
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A.

That material was present and you are

correct, but there were other items in the yard area
in addition to the materials in the trailers.
Q.

Is it a subjective judgment by the zoning

officer as to whether things are used materials?
A.

In some ways I guess that it could be.

Q.

Does the yard have junk on it?

A.

It did.

Q.

is the term "junk" defined in the Provo Cicy

A.

I'm not aware of whether it is or not.

Q.

Is the term "junk" defined in the Utah State

A.

I'm not aware of whether it is or not.

Q.

Is the term "junk" defined in the

Code?

Code?

department's policy and procedure?
A.

I'm not sure whether it is or not.

Q.

Is it possible that the junk you observed

was loaded on a trailer for disposal at the landfill
at its earliest opportunity?
A.

Some materials were, as I said just a minute

ago, but there were definitely other materials in the
yard area that were not loaded into a trailer, and
were not going to be moved at the earliest convenience
co a site other than the residence.
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I have no idea what your intentions were for
the materials since you did not contact me in response
to my letters, but we're talking about several months.
I would imagine in that time you would have had an
opportunity, if it was at your earliest convenience,
to move those in a two month period.
Q.

Is it a subjective judgment by the zoning

officer as to whether things are junk?
A.

In some ways it may be.

Q.

Does the property have household furniture

on it?
A.

I do not recall specifically whether there

are household -- was household furniture on the lot.
Q.

Is lawn furniture considered to be household

furniture?
A.

Lawn furniture, in my opinion, would not be

characteristic of the same furniture you would use in
your home.
Q.

Is outdoor furniture considered to be

household furniture?
A.

No, it does not.

Q.

Is there a definition of household furniture

in the Provo City Code?
A.

I'm not sure whether there is or not.

Q.

Is there a definition of household furniture
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in the Utah State Code?
A.

I'm not sure whether there is or not.

Q.

Is there a definition of household furniture

in the department's policy and procedure?
A.

I'm not sure whether there is or not.

Q.

And is it a subjective judgment by the

zoning officer as to whether things are household
furniture?
A.

Other than common sense of what is household

furniture, then I would say that it is a subjective
issue.
Q.

Does the property have appliances on it?

A.

On the lot or you mean in the yard area?

Q.

In the yard area.

A.

I have no idea what's in the backyard area,

I have noc seen it.

I do not recall specifically what

was in the front yard area other than recalling that
there were definitely items in violation of that
section, Section 14-34-080 in the yard area, March 19,
1996.

Unfortunately I did not keep a leg of specific

items in the yard area on that date.
Q.

Is it a yes or no answer to whether there's

appliances on the property as far as what you could
see?
A.

As far as what I could see I don't recall.
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1

Q.

Does the yard have scrap material on it?

2

A.

I would say yes, it did.

3

Q.

Is the term "scrap material" defined in the

4

Provo City Code?

5

A.

I'm not aware of whether it is or not.

6

Q.

Is the term "scrap material" defined in the

7

Utah State Code?

8

A.

I'm not sure whether it is or not.

9

Q.

Is the term "scrap material" defined in the

10

department's policy and procedure?

11

A.

I'm not sure whether it is or not.

12

Q.

is it possible that your alleged scrap

13

material was loaded on a trailer for disposal at the

14

landfill at its earliest opportunity?

15

A.

I guess it is possible that some of the

16

items on those trailers were scrap material, but there

17

is still definicely other materials on the subject lot

18

at that time.

19

Q.

20
21

Is it possible that your alleged scrap

J material was new material that hadn't been used yet?
A.

Some of it may have been that, but in my

22

opinion, there were other items on the lot that were

23

scrap material.

24
25

Q.

Is it uhe subjective judgment by the zoning

J officer as to whether things are scrap material?

1

A.

In some ways, yes, it is.

2

Q.

Does the yard have equipment or parts

3
4

thereof on it?
J

A.

Equipment or parts generally?

From what I

5

could see in the front yard area I would say yes,

6

under that general term.

7

have no idea whether or not there was those materials,

8

even though the ordinance does reference any open

9

area.

10

Again, in the backyard I

Because of physical limitations I could not see

what was in the backyard.

11

Q.

12

Is the term "equipment" defined in Provo

City Code?

13

Q.

14

State Code?

15

A.

I'm not sure whether it is or not.

16

Q.

Is the term "equipment" defined in the

17

department's policy and procedure?

18
19

Is the term "equipment" defined in Utah

j

20

A.

I'm not sure whether it is or not.

Q.

Is it a subjective judgment by the zoning

officer as to whether objects are equipment?

21

A.

Whether what?

22

Q.

Is it a subjective judgment by the zoning

23
24
25

officer as to whether objects are equipment?
I

A.

Again, other than common sense of being able

to identify whether an object is equipment or not, it
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is a subject interpretation.
Q.

Is there open areas within the boundaries of

this property?
A.

There is.

Q.

Is the term "open areas" defined in Provo

City Code?
A.

I'm not sure whether or not it is.

Q.

Is the term "open areas" defined in Utah

State Code?
A.

I'm not sure whether or not it is.

Q.

Is the term "open areas" defined in the

department's policy and procedure?
A.

I'm not sure whether or not it is.

Q.

Is the property exposed with an opaque or

sight obscuring fence?
A.

Not to the extent that it would screen the

materials from the public right-of-ways or adjacent
lots.
Q.

Is the sight obscuring fence at least

(inaudible) inches in height?
A.

I have not measured specifically how high

the fence is.
Q.

If the area in question is behind the

screening fence, is the area an open area in this lot?
A.

I guess anything is possible if we're
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speaking about what-if's.

In this specific situation

it is not enclosed, it is an open area in the front
yard.
Q.

Is it a subjective judgment by the zoning

officer as to whether an area within a fence -private yard is an open area?
A.

This ordinance says that the junk needs to

be inside of a building, so anything that's not inside
of a building would be an open area.
Q.

Has the defendant ever been charged with

violations of Provo City Ordinances before now?
MR. MCGINN:
THE COURT:
Q.

Objection, your Honor.
Sustained.

BY MS. PATTON:

When you first started

working for the zoning department approximately 17
months ago, were you handed an open file on Joan
Paccon?
A.

I do not recall whether it was open or not.

I was given the file, though.
Q.

Of which you have been in (inaudible) up

through this 17 months?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

Do you have any idea how old the fence is in

question?
A.

The fence on the subject lot?

SI

Q.

Yes, sir.

A.

According to the information you gave me, it

was in 1962 that it was put in, or there abouts.
Q.

Is the fence in question acting as an opaque

or sight obscuring structure required by another Provo
City Ordinance?
A.

The fence that is along the front property

line of the property that you own with the residents
on it?
Q.

Yes.

A.

It would not serve the purpose of being

opaque or screening to the extent the ordinance would
require to screen an inoperable vehicle.
Q.

Have the Pattons' neighbors complained about

the fence?
A.

I have not spoken to any of the neighbors

regarding your property.
Q.

Does the fence pose a risk to health safety

and welfare?
A.

This same fence that we're speaking about?

Q.

(Inaudible) utilizing the public streets and

walks?
A.

In my opinion probably not.

Q.

Are certain neighbors in the city held to a

higher zoning enforcement standards than others?
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A.

As zoning changes there are non-conforming

rights that different property owners may have.

In

that situation, yes, some are held to a different
standard than others.
Q.

Are there differences in policy and

procedure from neighborhood to neighborhood
(inaudible)?
A.

From zone to zone there are specific

requirements.
Q.

Is this the only property charged with a

violation in this neighborhood?
A.

With a violation in general or a specific

violation?
Q.

I'm the only one that's on my street that's

been charged with property violations?
A.

Period with any violation, that's what I'm

asking, or specifically with this-Q.

For a zoning (inaudible).

A.

No, you are not.

Q.

How many are there on the street?

A.

I would need to check my records to see

Do you

know?

historically what we have worked with since I have
worked in the city.
Q.

Did (inaudible) of this property arise after
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a citizen complaint?
A.

I had received and have received several

calls from concerned residents in regards to your
property.
Q.

And who would those residents be?

A.

I don't have that information in front of

Q.

But you do have it on file?

A.

That is correct.

Q.

Was a charge levied against this property

me.

because it had deteriorated to a level that existed at
the time prior to the charge?
A.

I cannot really answer that.

When I started

with the City I was given numerous cases and asked to
investigate those, and one such case was your
property.

Because there had been previous work on it

I did browse through the existing file, but did not
use the material in there.

I went out to the site and

saw an existing violation and proceeded with my action
as of that date in contacting you and requesting that
the property be brought into compliance.
MS. PATTON:

I have no more questions for

the witness at this time, your Honor, but would like
to reserve the right to inquire the witness further.
THE COURT:

You may.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. MCGINN:
Q.

Officer Malloy, forget about the trailer,

forget about the trailer right now on this piece of
property that we're talking about.
there.

Forget it's not

On that day we're there, on March 19, 1996,

was there scrap material, junk, garbage, trash in the
front yard area constituting a violation?
A.

There were.

Q.

Is it possible that two different zoning

officers could ever at one time go out to a piece of
property and one officer miss a violation?
A.

I would say that would be unlikely, but it

could happen.
MR. MCGINN:
THE COURT:

No further questions.
You may step down.

May I see the exhibits, please?
them right there?

Do you have

Thank you.

Call your next witness, will you, please?
MR. MCGINN:
THE COURT:

Mr. Roger Gonzalez.
Before Mr. Gonzalez testifies,

Mr. Schriner and Mr. Means?
Ms. Patton, is there a problem?
MS. PATTON:
THE COURT:

Yes, I object, your Honor.
Object to what?
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MS. PATT0N:

I asked him discovery who the

witnesses would be, and Mr. Malloy said that they had
no witnesses, your Honor.
THE COURT:
MS. PATTON:
THE COURT:

Well, let me address-Mr. McGinn, pardon me.
Let me address that in a minute.

Why don't you have a seat.
Before we call the next witness, the case
that was on before you folks has been resolved for
some time.

I want to dispose of it now so that these

folks can go on their way.
(Short recess taken)
THE COURT:

Thank you, folks, for the

interruption.
Now Mr. McGinn, you were calling another
witness?
MR. MCGINN:

Yes, your Honor, Roger

Gonzalez, and I believe they were objecting.
THE COURT:
objection.

Ms. Patton, you had an

State your objection, will you, please?

MS. PATTON:

I did not receive any discovery

that Mr. Gonzalez was going to be a witness, therefore
I have not had a chance to prepare.
THE COURT:

I didn't see any scheduling

order that said identification of witnesses.
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Mr. McGinn?
MR. MCGINN:

Your Honor, if I could respond

to that.
THE COURT:

Go ahead.

MR. MCGINN:

Joan Patton has come into

office several times.
policy.

Our office has an open file

I believe Mr. Humiston, I believe also, has

come in and asked for discovery.

In our office if --

and to show them, in our file -- if they come in we'll
allow them to look at the file, or we just make copies
of everything that's in the file.

We give everybody

everything, there should be no secrets, that's our
office policy and that's what we do.
With that, I know as Joan Patton has come in
several times, we do have a cover sheet.

It has a

list of our officers that says, "Anthony Malloy, Roger
Gonzalez from the zoning department."

Anytime they

come in and take a look that's there, and those are
the orders that we give for them for people who-THE COURT:

When did the defendants first

become aware of the name of Roger Gonzalez associated
in this charge?
MS. PATTON:
MR. HUMISTON:

Just now, your Honor.
Your Honor, every document in

this file was provided to me in discovery except the

one that Mr. McGinn is referring to.

This is the

first we've heard about Mr. Gonzalez.
I appreciate they do have an open file
policy and (inaudible) very generous, but this issue
has come up and we also find out for the first time
that there were neighbor complaints, which issue was
specifically addressed at the time of pre-trial.

So

I'm getting the impression that the open file policy
has been less than entirely open.
MR. MCGINN:

They've had access to

everything I have and more.

Joan's called me and

asked me for -- or Ms. Patton has called me and asked
me for files that community development's had that
I've not had in my possession, given those files to
her; she's been free to go through it.
THE COURT:

Well, there's nothing contained

in the files with respect to identification of
witnesses on either side -- objection to witnesses
identification or objection to exhibits.

That means

everything's been done informally.
MS. PATTON:
THE COURT:
MS. PATTON:

Can I be heard, your Honor?
Sure.
The motion for the bill of

particulars, which we've had a hearing on, I did
specifically at that time ask for a witness list and
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have not to this date been given a witness list, your
Honor, and I do not dispute what Mr. Malloy has
said -- or Mr. McGinn, I'm sorry.
I did in fact see everything that was in
that file except for the top page that I have just nov/
seen.
MR. MCGINN:

If I may approach just to show

the Court-THE COURT:

Just a moment.

Would you poinz

out for me, please, where in your bill of particulars
you ask for identification of witnesses?
MS. PATTON:

I did it verbally, your Honor,

before Judge Howard, in which I don't have a
transcript.
THE COURT:

I have your bill of particulars

and I have your memorandum in support of your bill cE
particulars, and there is nothing by way of any
request for witnesses.

I'm going to deny your

objection.
Mr. Gonzalez?
COURT CLERK:

You do solemnly swear that the

testimony you are about to give in this case now
pending before the Court will be the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
THE WITNESS:

I do.
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ROGER GONZALEZ
having been first duly sworn,
testifies as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. MCGINN:
Q.

Sir, would you please state your name for

the record?
A.

Roger Gonzalez.

Q.

For whom do you work?

A.

I work for Provo City, code enforcement

officer.
Q.

And how long have you done that?

A.

I have done that particular job for

approximately 16 months.
Q.

Officer, I want to direct your attention to

March 19, 19S6. Did you accompany Anthony Malloy to
1067 North 750 West on that day?
A.

I did.

Q.

Why did you do that?

A.

I was asked to go with him just to witness

the violation, which he basically had been addressing.
Q.

And when you arrived at that address what

did you do?
A.

I proceeded to take the camera and take some

photographs of the purported violations.
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Q.

Officer, do you recognize these photos that

have been entered into evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit
1 and 2?
A.

I do.

Q.

Did you take those?

A.

I did.

Q.

Does Exhibit 1 or Exhibit 2 show in any

detail the interior area of the Patton property?
A.

It does not, it shows only the trailer,

which is in the driveway area.
Q.

Would you describe for the Court what types

of materials you saw in the front yard area at this
address on that date?
A.

I saw some debris of wood and lumber scraps

that were laying around throughout the vicinity of the
yard.

I also saw some boxes --it looked like it

contains either canned food or fruits and vegetables,
that type of thing.

I saw some cardboard paper, I saw

some other materials that were enclosed in plastic
bags.
THE COURT:

Were those items on the street

side of the fence or the house side of the fence?
THE WITNESS:

They were on the house side of

the fence.
Q.

BY MR. MCGINN:

Were there additional items
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Q.

Is this on the sidewalk?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Adjacent to the property?

A.

Adjacent to the property in front of the

property.
Q.

And how far away were you from the actual

materials that you've just described?
A.

I was probably five, ten feet, not very far.

Q.

Were you able to see it clearly from the

sidewalk?
A.

I was.
MR. MCGINN:

No further questions, your

Honor.
THE COURT:

Ms. Patton, do you have any

questions for him?
MS. PATTON:

In the interest of time, your

Honor, because I was not aware and did not prepare for
this, I'm going to ask Mr. Humiston to question
(inaudible).
THE COURT:

Well, he's not going to question

for both of you.
MR. HUMISTON:

I'm going to question him on

behalf of Mr. Patton, but I guess she doesn't have any
questions prepared because we did not know about this
witness.
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see it?

1

MR. HUMISTON:

2

Yes.

(Defendant's Exhibit No. 1 received into evidence)

3

THE COURT:

4

Mr . Humiston, anything else from |

you, sir?

5
6

i

MR. HUMISTON:

7

• Honor.
THE COURT:

IS Mr. Patton going co testify?

MR. HUMISTON:

THE COURT:

No further evidence, your

He is not.

Thank you very much.

Does the City want to be heard?
MR. MCGINN:
THE COURT:

Closing arguments, your Honor?
Yes, sir, closing arguments,

we're now in that posture.
MR. MCGINN:

Thank you.

Your Honor, there-

has been much made of discrimination, singling out the
Pattons.

There's no evidence of that.

Anthony Mailoy

testified that there are several violations in that
area that they are working on, he didn't have his
notes to tell them how many other violations are in
the neighborhood.

Nobody's targeting the Pattons.

Officer Mailoy, Officer Gonzales went out to
the property, saw on March 19, 1996 that there was
garbage, junk, materials in the -- may I approach,
your Honor, they are right there.
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THE COURT:
MR. MCGINN:

Go ahead.
They testified that from that

photo you can't see clearly the interior of the yard,
but Mr, Gonzalez was clear in that he stood on the
sidewalk, looked in the yard, and described the types
of materials; lumber that was in various bits and
pieces, food upon the ground that were not covered,
there was some questions alluding to the fact that
this could have been firewood, but it was not kept -there is no evidence that it was kept in any sort of
manner, there is no evidence that it was used as
firewood.

There was boxes, bags strewn across the

front yard.
They are clearly in violation.
a violation that needs to be addressed.

When there's
If the

property gets cleaned up and in five months there's
another violation, that violation needs to be
addressed.
We think the evidence that has been
presented to the Court is clear. There's only been
three witnesses, both Officers Malloy and Gonzalez
testified that the yard in question did have junk,
garbage, material, trash.
Mr. Keller for the defense testified --he
testified that the whole neighborhood --he testified
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this was something he had only found out last week.
So I would submit that as far as the count
that remains, the State has failed to establish a
prima facia case of a violation, and we would rest on
that.
THE COURT:
MR. MCGINN:

Thank you, sir.
Thank you, your Honor.

Subjective to termination, your Honor, terms and
ordinances have their plain and ordinary meaning, and
I understand that some people may consider one man's
garbage is another man's treasure.

But in this case

the evidence was clear there were wood strewn about
the lawn with -- uncovered that had been weathered,
there were paper or cartons -- cardboard cartons thai:
were overflowing, splitting, had been left out in the
weather, were in a weathered condition.
I think this clearly under the plain and
ordinary words used in the ordinance, 14-34-080, are
trash, junk, materials that are clearly in the area.
As far as any intent, the officer indicated
that he sent a letter indicating that there was a
violation, the letter came back from Ms. Patton
indicating that she didn't think there was a
violation.
As to the meaning of the vehicle, whether
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this trailer is junk, operational, the statute that
was cited and read by Anthony Malloy --by Joan Patton
and read by Anthony Malloy, 41-1A-1008, deals with
salvaged titles and selling inoperable vehicles for
scrap.

It has nothing to do with whether a vehicle is

inoperable or abandoned in dealing with zoning,
because it's salvaged titles.
And whether the Court considers the
vehicle -- the trailer, I think that's really
irrelevant, because not looking at the trailer,
there's certainly sufficient testimony offered by two
witnesses that is unrebutted by anybody that there was
junk and materials that would fit the plain and
ordinary meaning of 14-34-080.
Submit it on that to the Court.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

From the testimony

provided, and from the exhibits that have been
received, I have difficulty in being able to determine
that the first part of Count I of an unlicensed motor
vehicle, a wrecked, junked or partially dismantled or
inoperative or abandoned motor vehicle was present on
the defendant's property.
Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2 are really of
not much assistance to me to make any determination as
to whether the yard is in compliance or it's not.
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All those photographs really show is a
residence with a bunch of material out in front and a
parked trailer.
Mr. Malloy testified that he didn't remember
if the trailer had flat tires on it on March 19th or
not, and he said he had no evidence of whether the
trailer was registered or whether it wasn't.
The second portion of the City's charging
offense contained in Count I is the defendant, also
during the time in question, stored trash, used
materials, junk, household furniture, appliances,
scrap materials, equipment or parts thereof in an open
area not screened from the public streets and adjacent
properties by an opaque wall or fence.
In reading the statute and hearing the
testimony that's been provided by Mr. Malloy and Mr.
Gonzalez, which is the testimony we have, and the
testimony of Mr. Keller that we had a rather
dilapidated neighborhood in which the defendants'
property complied in making it appear to be the same
as the neighborhood in question, I find that the City
has met its burden of proof concerning the second
portion of that charging information in Count I,
therefore I find the defendants guilty as charged.
From the plain and simple meaning of the

116

ordinance, so you have your record on appeal, folks, I
believe that the evidence has sufficiently
demonstrated that there are items which consist of
junk, stored trash, scraps of wood, deteriorated
cardboard boxes, and even potential food products that
looked like they had gone bad, from the witness'
testimony.
And with that testimony being the only
testimony on the record, with nothing else to rebut it
or to describe what it was, then the Court has only
one conclusion to draw, and that is is it believable
or is it not, and I find that the City has met its
proof with respect to belief.
The questions that came from the defendant,
Mrs. Patton, was it possible for these things to be
something else.

I guess it's possible that Haley Bob

comet had a spaceship behind it.
not.

Probable?

Probably

It's possible that all of these things were

meant for the burning of firewood?

Possible.

But

from the testimony I have on the record, and I have to
make a finding from the testimony, it's probable that
it was not firewood.

So I find the defendants guilty

as charged in Count I.
What's your pleasure with respect to
sentencing?

You may be sentenced today on each of
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Now Mr. Humiston, you had something to say?
MR. HUMISTON:

Well, your Honor, you

addressed my objection in advance.

I certainly

strenuously object to any reference to the other lot
in relation to sentencing on this lot.

Certainly, as

far as it's relevant, if the State is anticipating
another prosecution, we're back to square 1, we will
bring all the objections based on constitutionality
and various other motions.
But I certainly -- I agree with the Court, I
think you addressed our objection already that any
sentencing with this lot has to pertain strictly with
this lot.
THE COURT:

I have no problem if Mr. Malloy

and the Pattons with you, sir, want to meet and
discuss what, if anything, needs to be done to bring
1067 North 750 West into compliance, and then make
recommendations at the time of sentencing concerning
that issue.

I'd be happy to hear those from both

sides, but that's where we're going to restrict
ourselves.
MR. HUMISTON:

If I respond, your Honor,

just to review what we've done here today, Count II
was dismissed and Count I, the finding was based on
trash that was illegally in the yard on March 19th.
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1

THE COURT:

I found a violation of Count I.

2

MR. HUMISTON:

3

THE COURT:

Right.

The violation is based upon the

4

trash that was found in the front yard, as you've

5

phrased it.

6

And so I understand that

MR. HUMISTON:

7

when we, at the first sentencing, sentencing will

8

pertain to the issues as found in Court's finding,

9

specifically trash in the yard; is that correct?

10

THE COURT:

My sentence will pertain to the

11

fact that the property is out of compliance with the

12

zoning because of the material that has been testified

13

to as being in the yard.

14

MR. HUMISTON:

15

THE COURT:

Okay, thank you.

There is nothing in the street

16

that I have found at this time that is out of

17

compliance with the ordinance.

18
19

MR. HUMISTON:
schedule the sentencing.

20
21
22

I think we can go ahead and

COURT CLERK:

We can set it on June llth at

9 o'clock.
THE COURT:

Is June llth at 9 a.m.

n3

acceptable to you, Mrs. Patton?

24

MS. PATTON:

25

Your Honor, can we extend it

just about another week?

I have a woman whose baby is

MS. PATTON:
THE COURT:

I did, your Honor.
Do you want to comment with

regard to this request?
MS. PATTON:
THE COURT:

I would, your Honor.
Go ahead.

MS. PATTON:

As the Court pointed out, the

entire discovery process has been handled very
informally.

In the memorandum that Mr. Malloy sent to

Mr. McGinn, he states that he took the pictures that
were entered in as evidence.

This is the same

memorandum that mentions that Roger Gonzalez was
another zoning officer.
Mr. Romney was the attorney from Provo City
at my arraignment.

He states on the court record that

I will be given "everything that we have" from my
verbal discovery request to the Court at the time from
this statement.

I conclude that the terms "everything

in evidence, witness lists, complaints, et cetera."
At the pre-trial conference Mr. Malloy was
present, Mr. McGinn was present, I was there, Natalie
Zabriskie, Michael Humiston was also present. Mr.
Gonzalez was not present.

At this conference I was

asked -- I asked who the comolainants were, who the
witnesses were, and Mr. Malloy informed me that there
were no complainants, that he was the only one, that

A

this case originated because of an open file that he
had been given when he first started working for Provo
City.
Let me emphasize that Mr. Gonzalez was not
present, nor was his name even mentioned.

Mr. Malloy

further lead me to believe that the pictures that were
in the file were taken by him.
On three separate occasions I scheduled
appointments with Mr. Malloy to come out to the
property and tell me what the problems were.

Each

time Mr. Malloy arrived he came with another person,
an intern named Bryce.
At none of these meetings was Mr. Gonzalez
mentioned.

He was not present, and I was further lead

to believe that Mr. Malloy had taken all the pictures
and was the only zoning officer involved in this case.
Accordingly I prepared my defense based on
the City only using the items they had showed me as
evidence, as Mr. Malloy as the sole witness.

From the

record of the trial is this evident that I had that
had che trial proceeded I was lead to believe that it
would, the outcome would have been completely
different.
It is obvious that the only testimony that
allowed for the conviction was the testimony of Mr.

q

Gonzalez, and like Mr. Malloy, who had I prepared
cross exam questions for, I had absolutely no time or
opportunity to prepare any type of cross exam of Mr.
Gonzalez.
Had I known about the admission of Mr.
Gonzalez, the admission of the additional surprise
witness, I could have prepared for this eventuality.
By the Court allowing testimony from this surprise
witness, my case was unduly prejudiced, I was denied
due process, I was not given the opportunity to face
and cross question my accusers as guaranteed by this
judicial system.

The principle of fundamental

fairness was compromised, and I did not get a fair
trial.
I personally did not feel that this one
admission was done deliberately or maliciously, nor do
I believe that the oversight was intention on the part
of the Provo City prosecutor.

However, in the

interest of fundamental fairness, due process, and
opportunity to defend against accusers, I would ask
that this Court grant this motion for the arrest of
judgment at this time.
THE COURT:

Do you want to be heard,

Counsel?
MR. MCGINN:

Yes, your Honor.

I believe

